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**Africa Review**

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7 February 1986

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**Africa Review**

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Burkinan President Sankara may look to Libya for arms and security assistance following his country's recent military defeat by Mali. Relations between the two countries have been strained, but Sankara fears his neighbors plan to topple him and we believe he may seek Libyan aid to ensure survival.

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President Abdallah, a pro-Western conservative, is beset by rising popular discontent over his poor administration of the economy and the lingering presence of the widely hated European mercenary contingent that keeps him in power.

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Faced with an estimated loss of \$200 million for 1985, automobile industry representatives have made urgent appeals to the government for aid, stressing that industry failure would add to South Africa's serious black unemployment problem.

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

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## Articles

### Angola: Reactions to Savimbi's US Visit

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Initial international reaction to the visit to Washington of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has been largely predictable. Soviet Bloc countries—Angola's primary patrons—and most black African states, regional groups, and some prominent South African blacks have been highly critical. South Africa and Angola have taken advantage of the visit to reiterate their differing positions on regional negotiations. A few moderate black African states, however, have quietly expressed private support for Savimbi, and Zaire continues to extend behind-the-scenes logistic support. Over the long run, a small number of black African nations may follow suit, but most will either lie low or follow the lead of the OAU, which officially backs Luanda.

#### Soviet Bloc Reaction

In a well-publicized show of solidarity with its Angolan client, Moscow hosted a delegation of senior Angolan officials during the last week of January. Angolan Defense Minister Tonha, Interior Minister Rodrigues, and economic czar do Nascimento met on 28 January with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Defense Minister Sokolov, and Communist Party Secretary Pomanarev. The Angolans' visit, according to the US Embassy in Moscow, was designed to coincide both with Savimbi's visit to the United States and the conclusion of US Assistant Secretary of State Crocker's consultations in southern Africa.

Widespread criticism of the United States and South Africa, and professions of solidarity with Angola in the Soviet press, were not accompanied by any public commitments of new Soviet aid to Angola. The Soviets suggested, however, that they would grant additional military aid to Luanda if UNITA receives US assistance. Moscow did announce the signing of

an economic aid protocol that probably fulfilled a 1982 agreement.

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Meanwhile, the Soviet press carried reports that the United States was considering granting Savimbi \$300-500 million. Casting US aid to Savimbi as a fait accompli, one Soviet press article claimed Savimbi was working out details on what sort of military equipment he wanted to be delivered from the United States.

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Public criticism aside, the Soviet coverage of the tripartite talks does not rule out further Angolan participation in US-sponsored Namibian negotiations. The Soviet press described the Angolan platform that was spelled out in a September 1984 announcement as "a just basis" for achieving agreement on Namibia's independence.

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The Cubans joined in the talks in Moscow. Representing Havana were Jorge Risquet Valdes, special envoy in charge of Cuban-Angolan affairs and overseer of Cuban affairs in Sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1970s; Lionel Soto, Cuban Ambassador to the USSR and O. Rosales del Toro, Chief of the Cuban military's general staff.

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The Cuban press has largely echoed the Soviets'. In addition, Havana television on 30 January contrasted Reagan's meeting with Savimbi with "the White House's indifference to the presence in the United States of South African Bishop and Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu, who criticized the repression of Pretoria's racist regime, which receives the assistance of the United States."

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### Angolan and South African Responses

Angola and South Africa took advantage of Savimbi's visit to reiterate their longstanding differences on regional negotiations. Luanda sent several senior officials abroad, in addition to the visits to the USSR, to lobby its cause and encourage public criticism of Savimbi. [ ]

Some Angolan officials have recently raised the possibility that US support to Savimbi would jeopardize Angolan participation in US-sponsored regional negotiations, while others—along with those of the government-controlled radio in Luanda—have stressed that the Angolans would continue to seek a dialogue with the United States. There has been no divergence of views in Angola's reiteration of its longstanding unwillingness to talk with Savimbi under any circumstances. In addition, Luanda has stressed that US aid to UNITA only reinforces its need for Cuban troops. [ ]

Angolan assurances that a dialogue will continue appear designed to discourage the United States from granting a sizable amount of aid to Savimbi and to buy time while its military prepares for another major offensive against UNITA. Moreover, officials in Angola may reason that they have nothing to lose by talking with Washington. Finally, continued talks may serve to placate the average Angolan. [ ]

Meanwhile, South Africa has given widespread attention to the Savimbi visit; most public commentary has been highly supportive. In general, the South African press has used the occasion to stress the commonality of South African and US goals in the region—that is, a reduction of Communist influence and the introduction of a democratic government in Angola. One exception, however, was an Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Transvaler*, which on 29 January told Savimbi he should not place "too many hopes on his trip to Washington" and urged him to realize that "there is a difference between what the Americans say and what they do." *Die Transvaler* continued by predicting that an increase in Soviet aid to Luanda would probably accompany any US aid to UNITA. [ ]

In what is probably part of an effort to distract attention from Pretoria's links to Savimbi, the South African Government has made no official mention of his trip to the United States. President Botha, during his opening address to Parliament on 31 January, however, stressed that the Cubans' withdrawal from Angola remained a prerequisite for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and for any reduction in South African troops in Namibia. [ ]

Key black South Africans were notably harsh in their criticism of Savimbi. To date, both Anglican Bishop Tutu and Winnie Mandela have spoken out. In a written statement delivered on 24 January, Mandela claimed, "The American administration not only approves of this conduct (South Africa's attacks and sanctions against its neighbors) but has now followed the example set by this racist regime by giving overt aid to and receiving officially in Washington the bandit Savimbi, who with the aid of disguised South African troops has caused such economic havoc, death and destruction to the people of Angola." [ ]

### Black African States and Regional Group Attitudes

African regional groups and the Nonaligned Movement have set the tone of future commentary from most individual black African states by condemning Savimbi's trip to Washington. The lobbying efforts by Angolan officials in Lusaka, where Zambian President Kaunda is the current chairman of the Frontline States, and in Harare, where the Southern African Development Coordination Conference was preparing to meet, undoubtedly were designed to close ranks among African states. So far, Savimbi's US trip has been criticized by Southern African Development Coordination Conference Chairman Peter Mmusi (Botswana's Vice President), Frontline States leader Kaunda, the OAU's Liberation Committee, the Nonaligned Coordination Bureau, and the group of African nations at the United Nations. A UN Security Council meeting called by Sudan for early February will almost certainly follow suit. [ ]

Most African states to date have expressed no reaction to Savimbi's visit. Moderates like Zaire and Malawi are probably trying to keep their heads down.

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Others, however, have voiced their complaints loudly and clearly. Their criticism has centered on what they see as Washington's unwillingness to respect the OAU's support for the MPLA as a counter to Pretoria's backing of UNITA. They also argue that United States aid to UNITA would impact adversely on Washington's role as an honest broker in regional negotiations, and assert that Washington, in helping Savimbi, would strengthen its cooperation with South Africa. [ ]

Several of those countries that supported the MPLA before Angolan independence have taken the lead in commenting on the visit:

- Libya has sent a letter to the UN Secretary General in which it accuses the United States of expressing a "racist and discriminatory tendency" as well as "a religious cultural and civilizational bias" as seen in President Reagan's willingness to receive Savimbi and not the PLO.
- Tanzania, in the government-controlled *Daily News*, criticized Savimbi's red-carpet treatment in Washington and appealed to the United States to think twice about aiding Savimbi.
- A Ghanaian Foreign Ministry official called in our Ambassador to express "deep concern" over the visit. [ ]

Other black African states that supported UNITA during the civil war in Angola have spoken out publicly against US aid to UNITA. Privately, however, they have confided in US officials their desire to see Washington support Savimbi:

- The Gabonese Ambassador told a US State Department official that Gabon favors US aid to Savimbi but that this should be done covertly and that such assistance should be accorded with the overriding objective of bringing about a political settlement and the restoration of peace.
- The Ivorian Permanent Representative to the United Nations told a US official on 25 January that the United States should give more support to Savimbi and UNITA. The Ivorian claimed that Angolan President dos Santos was too isolated and too dependent on Moscow and Havana to resolve Angola's internal problems. [ ]

#### Outlook

Savimbi's visit to Washington has caused considerable concern and confusion among the leaders of many black African states. They view the possibility of US aid to Savimbi as a move that would only heighten superpower stakes in a regional problem that already appears complicated and intractable. Moreover, some black Africans assume that Moscow will match any US aid to Savimbi, thereby prolonging the insurgency in Angola. [ ]

Most moderate black African leaders will probably voice these doubts in private to US officials, while other, less friendly governments will continue to express their concerns in public. We do not expect many black African states—if any at all—to speak out in support of Savimbi. There have been only a few instances when Africans have openly disagreed with an OAU position. Those who are sympathetic to UNITA—such as Ivory Coast—are likely to express these views quietly for fear of criticism or reprisals from the OAU majority. Moreover, the number of those who would be willing to extend behind-the-scenes support for Savimbi—like Zaire—will probably remain very small. [ ]

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
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
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## South Africa: Agricultural Exports, 1982



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South Africa:  
Effects of Drought on Corn Production

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## South Africa: White Farmers Experiencing Economic Problems

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Conservative Afrikaner farmers—long considered the backbone of the ruling National Party—face significant economic problems, including an overwhelming debt burden compounded by drought and changing government farm policies. Rightwing opponents of the National Party's program of limited racial reform have made gains in recent elections in this small but influential sector of white South Africa.

### The Yoke of Debt

High interest rates and the severe drought that gripped South Africa's major grain-producing region from 1982 to 1985—the worst in 200 years—have left the country's corn and wheat farmers overburdened with debt, according to press reports. Prime lending rates as high as 25 percent increased farm production costs by about 20 percent in 1984, according to US Embassy reporting. Total agricultural debt topped \$5 billion in October 1985, and the annual interest burden is more than \$500 million. Commercial bank credit is the largest component of the debt burden, and interest payments are now the single highest cost in agricultural production, according to Embassy reporting. Net income of agriculture as a percentage of total farming debt declined from 35 percent in 1982 to 16 percent in 1983, according to Embassy reporting. Some 25,000 farmers have left their farms since 1975, many because of bankruptcy, according to US Embassy reporting.

### Legacy of Intervention

Pretoria historically has protected the white farming sector and provided access to cheap financing. About 90 percent of South Africa's agricultural production is controlled by government regulations, and some 70 percent of farm output is sold to government agricultural marketing boards, which set the prices farmers receive for crops and consumers pay for agricultural products. The marketing boards

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### *Agriculture—An Important Sector of the Economy*

*Agricultural products make up about 10 percent of exports—which makes South Africa an important source of food to southern Africa—and also provide inputs to the manufacturing sector. In constant dollars, the agricultural sector grew by about 35 percent between 1960 and 1981, but its share of percent of GDP has decreased over time, losing ground to mining and manufacturing, according to press reports. The percentage of arable land is small (about 12 percent), but the volume of agricultural production has virtually doubled in the past 20 years, according to press reports.*

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*Pretoria has attempted to promote a high growth rate in agriculture because investments in agriculture create more jobs than those in the mining and industrial sectors. Agriculture is the country's largest employer—some 52 percent of the total population lives in rural areas, and about 28 percent of the economically active population is employed in agriculture and fishing, according to press reports. Subsistence farming provides the most employment, but the bulk of agricultural production comes from modern commercial farms owned by some 64,500 white farmers, according to press reports. The number of both whites and blacks employed in agriculture has declined, however, because of mechanization and a trend toward larger farms. White employment in agriculture began to decline in absolute numbers in 1936, and the number of blacks with jobs in agriculture has dropped by 2 percent per year since the late 1950s, according to press reports.*

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frequently are criticized by consumers as inefficient and biased toward the producers, according to press reports. [ ]

South African farm policy began to shift toward a free market in 1981, exposing farmers to higher interest rates, according to press reports. This policy shift was reconfirmed last year by the final report of an eight-year-long government-commissioned study of the country's monetary policy. The study recommended that all interest rates be market oriented, including once-subsidized farm loans. This change has reduced substantially a controversial concession to farmers that in effect increased their access to credit by treating their debt as an asset against which banks could make additional loans. Farmers now pay 14 to 15 percent for subsidized loans rather than the 15.5-percent prime lending rate, compared with a subsidy of 8 to 9 percentage points in late 1981, according to press reports. [ ]

#### **Farmers in Politics**

Rightwing parties, campaigning against racial reform and criticizing the National Party's economic policies, have made gains in recent byelections in rural areas, campaigning against racial reform and criticizing the National Party's economic policies. The government's denial of corn price increases and the repeal of some major apartheid laws before the May 1985 provincial elections in rural Orange Free State Province, in our view, led to a dramatic drop in the National Party vote compared with previous byelections. This pattern of lower National Party majorities in rural areas continued in the October 1985 byelections. [ ]

Farmers are lobbying energetically against Pretoria's steps toward deregulation of agriculture. Deregulation will lower the prices farmers receive for their crops and undoubtedly increase the number of farm bankruptcies, which doubled in the first nine months of 1985 compared with the same period in 1984, according to US Embassy reporting. In early 1985 marketing board decisions against farmers led to a protest by about 2,000 farmers, which, in our view, influenced Pretoria's decision to subject marketing board decisions to review by a competition board. [ ]

We believe farmers face different regional security and economic conditions than most South African whites. Farmers in the border regions of northern Transvaal Province are concerned with security against terrorism that threatens both land values and the stability of the white population in the region, according to press reports. African National Congress (ANC) insurgents have used this area for infiltration for some time, and recently a series of landmine explosions killed eight whites. Farmers affected by government plans to consolidate the fragments of black "homelands" have lobbied actively against the plans, largely with success. By contrast, sugar farmers in Natal Province support plans for joint administration of the black homeland of KwaZulu and Natal, according to press reporting. [ ]

#### **Outlook**

An apparent end to the drought in late November last year, combined with a fall in prime lending rates from a peak of 25 percent in February 1985 to a current 15.5 percent, has improved economic prospects significantly for many farmers. Nonetheless, the wheat crop this growing season has been disappointing, and the expected corn crop of 9 million metric tons is far short of record levels. Moreover, Pretoria publicly has stated that it wants to hold the line on corn price increases in spite of farmer opposition. Under the impact of reduced subsidies and heavy debt burdens, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 farmers will go out of business in the next several years, according to press reports. [ ]

Poor economic conditions are, in our view, the primary cause of eroding National Party strength among farmers in recent elections. We believe Pretoria can continue to implement limited racial reforms—without seriously jeopardizing its support among farmers—until reform measures begin directly to affect farmers' economic interests. Many farmers are reluctant to break with the National Party but will do so if government spending programs for blacks further cut government programs that support agriculture. [ ]

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## Tanzania: Old Faces, New Jobs

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President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his key lieutenants are stymied in their efforts to reverse Tanzania's deepening economic crisis by the specter of former President Nyerere, who, as chairman of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Tanzania's sole political party, has de jure authority over the government. Although the new regime recognizes the need for structural reforms, it has so far shied away from what would amount to a defiance of Nyerere's African socialist policy. As a result, Tanzanians are increasingly questioning Mwinyi's ability to assert himself as his government's "honeymoon" draws to a close.



President Ali Hassan Mwinyi

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Revered as Tanzania's founding father, Nyerere retains the constitutional authority to bring down Mwinyi's government. He controls the National Executive Committee, the party's policy-monitoring body that is comprised mainly of proponents of Nyerere's socialist dogma. In our view, however, Nyerere is unlikely to take drastic measures—such as overruling a government decision—although we expect him to exert subtle pressure to determine key policies.

November 1985. He has, however, initiated some of the successful reforms he brought about as President of Zanzibar in 1984-85: liberalizing trade and import policies, streamlining the state-owned companies, and relaxing restrictions on the private use of foreign exchange. Mwinyi also publicly supported an accommodation with the IMF—a significant departure from the past for symbolic as well as economic reasons.

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The new government's most pressing task is to arrest Tanzania's economic collapse, which has seen the near total breakdown of the country's infrastructure, the development of a thriving black market, declining productivity, a 25- to 30-percent inflation rate, and the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. The current fuel crisis has brought industry, public services, crop harvesting, and transportation to a halt throughout the country. According to US Embassy reporting, Tanzanians soon will no longer tolerate poor economic conditions, and social restiveness is likely unless the new government can bring about visible improvement.

Caution and modesty are part of Mwinyi's personal style, as well as a means of avoiding open conflict until he can consolidate his precarious political position. The former teacher was, in fact, a reluctant candidate for Nyerere's job.

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he displayed a disconcerting lack of ambition and a self-effacing manner during the run

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### Ali Hassan Mwinyi: Still an Ugly Duckling

Mwinyi has avoided a "quick fix" approach to daunting economic problems since coming to power in

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for the nomination. In public speeches, Mwinyi repeatedly echoes Nyerere's call for "socialism and self-reliance." Only days after assuming office, Mwinyi traveled to Nyerere's home village for consultations, suggesting to some observers that the new President was uncertain of his direction and would be kept on a short leash. [ ]

Despite Mwinyi's caution and continued deference to Nyerere, we believe that he may emerge as a pragmatic and independent leader in his own right when—and if—Nyerere retires from the CCM chairmanship in 1987. At present, however, Mwinyi must walk a fine line between the old and the new, in our judgment. Pragmatists within the government [ ]

[ ] have already expressed disappointment and impatience with Mwinyi's cautious approach to reform. On the other hand, Mwinyi must take care not to antagonize Nyerere and other strident orthodox socialists, including CCM Secretary General Rashidi Kawawa and the party's powerful youth wing, Vijana. [ ]

#### Mwinyi's Team

Mwinyi's Cabinet consists primarily of Nyerere's former lieutenants who in recent months have started to emerge from Nyerere's shadow and may soon exercise more authority than previously allowed. Although each has built a career under Nyerere's tutelage, we believe that the younger Cabinet ministers will strike out on new paths in an effort to ameliorate Tanzania's economic problems. Nevertheless, the new regime appears as divided as the old. [ ]

**Joseph Sinde Warioba.** Warioba, a confidant and fellow tribesman of Nyerere's, was a surprise choice for prime minister, and most observers expected him to use the position to ensure that Nyerere retained a considerable degree of influence in the new government. Since assuming office, however, Warioba, who is also First Vice President, has exhibited a surprisingly independent stance. The former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Warioba is his country's foremost authority on international legal issues. Thoughtful and mild



Prime Minister Joseph Sinde Warioba [ ]

mannered, Warioba is respected for his honesty, hard work, and tenacious defense of his principles, say US diplomats. In the near term, we expect him to move rapidly to overcome his lack of domestic experience and to build a strong base of popular support. Although in recent years he has on occasion filled in as acting Foreign Minister, his exposure to international diplomacy is largely limited to southern African affairs; he has taken part in a number of meetings of the Frontline States. [ ]

As Prime Minister, Warioba [ ]


[ ] has stressed the need for "less talk and more work"—a pragmatic approach to Tanzania's endemic problems of mismanagement and corruption, although it has probably had little impact on the average Tanzanian, according to US diplomats. [ ]

**Salim Ahmed Salim.** Veteran diplomat Salim Salim, recently appointed Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, has amassed an impressive record in international and domestic politics. Although only 43 years old, he has 10 years' experience as his country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York; he served as President of the General Assembly in 1979-80 and was a strong contender to become UN Secretary General in 1981. He then

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*Defense Minister Salim Ahmed Salim* [redacted]



*Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs Cleopa Msuya*

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served successively as Foreign Minister (1981-84) and Prime Minister (1984-85). US diplomats call him the "superminister"; in addition to his ministerial portfolios, he is a member of the CCM Central Committee and the National Executive Committee, and heads the CCM Commission for Defense and Security and Foreign Affairs. [redacted]

Although he was widely considered the strongest of the three leading candidates for the presidential nomination in August 1985, Salim's campaign was undermined by a small but determined clique on Zanzibar that objected to his Arab origins and his association in the 1960s with a small, radical political party of Zanzibar's Arab minority. Salim's subsequent appointment as Defense Minister reflects his strong base of support in the military, according to US diplomats, and the creation of the position of Deputy Prime Minister is a consolation prize as well as a recognition of his impressive abilities. [redacted]

Salim avowedly supports Mwinyi, but we have little doubt that he eyes the presidency himself. We believe he favors a pragmatic approach to the country's economic and social malaise. [redacted]

**Cleopa Msuya.** Cleopa Msuya is head of the combined Ministries for Finance, Planning, and Economic Affairs. Msuya retains the finance portfolio—which he has held since 1982—but also has

assumed the portfolios formerly held by Kighoma Malima, the staunchly ideological ex-Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs and one of the principal roadblocks to economic liberalization. The consolidation of economic power in Msuya's hands is viewed by most observers as a victory for the pragmatists because of Msuya's excellent and realistic grasp of the country's economic problems and the policy changes that must be made to address them, according to US diplomats. [redacted]

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Msuya has been granted virtual autonomy in conducting negotiations with the IMF, although currency devaluation, farm subsidies, and austerity measures remain formidable obstacles to an agreement. He has long been one of the strongest proponents of reaching an agreement, [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe Msuya is a key to any economic recovery program. [redacted]

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**Idris Abdul Wakil.** One of Tanzania's two Vice Presidents and the President of Zanzibar, Wakil brings limited political experience to his position. US diplomats say he appears to lack the vigor and the determination needed to contend with domestic

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
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Vice President and President of  
Zanzibar Idris Abdul Wakil ☐



Secretary General of CCM  
Rashidi Kawawa ☐

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political intrigues. Elected President of Zanzibar by a narrow margin, Wakil confronts political, racial, regional, and generational animosities on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. ☐

Kawawa, who, despite his shrewdness and political skill, is in the twilight of his political career. ☐

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Kawawa was strongly favored by the orthodox "old guard" of the CCM for the presidential nomination. In the final weeks before the CCM Party Congress in August 1985, he launched an unexpectedly strong bid for a popular mandate, making tours into outlying regions and instigating a virulent smear campaign against then leading candidate Salim. Kawawa's campaign ran aground, however, because of powerful opposition from the military and his inability to overcome his ties to some of the worst failures of Tanzanian socialism. ☐

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☐ US diplomats, however, note that he is a political moderate who is probably friendly to the West, ☐

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**Rashidi Kawawa.** One of Nyerere's most trusted confidants, Kawawa, who has been Secretary General of the CCM since 1982, has long been regarded as the bulwark of socialist orthodoxy in Tanzania, and we expect him to oppose vigorously any move toward progressive reform. We believe he will act as Nyerere's liaison and watchdog within the new government, allowing the former President to preserve the appearance, at least, of noninterference. While we expect Mwinyi to reshuffle the Cabinet—possibly later this year—Kawawa's powerful base in the party and long-standing relationship with Nyerere make it inadvisable for Mwinyi to remove him from the government. We expect Mwinyi to try to circumvent

#### Outlook

In our view, Nyerere's influence will eventually wane as the new government gains confidence and sophistication in dealing with domestic affairs. At present, the new leadership's generally provincial political background—and its resulting hesitancy to grapple with complex international issues—has left a breach in Tanzania's foreign orientation that allows Nyerere to continue as the country's most prominent international spokesman. However, we believe this too will pass as Mwinyi, Warioba, and Salim, anxious to escape Nyerere's influence, establish their independent political credentials. ☐

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The Mwinyi government probably hopes that over time it will be able to move out from under Nyerere's shadow and begin addressing Tanzania's ills. We believe, however, that the growing impatience of the country's military and civilian sectors with Mwinyi's lack of initiative could deny him this opportunity. In fact, Nyerere might reassert de facto control if he thinks that political stability is genuinely threatened by social unrest. [REDACTED]

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**Zimbabwe:  
Growing Corruption**

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A recent well-publicized series of arrests and dismissals in the national police are the latest in a flurry of corruption scandals plaguing Prime Minister Mugabe's government and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union. In a yearend report for 1985, the Auditor General's Office—the independent agency that monitors the government's finances—stated incidents of corruption were on the rise and costing the country millions of dollars.

his wife, several Cabinet members, and senior party officials have been rumored for several years to be involved in corruption and illegal business activities.

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Despite public statements that civil servants found guilty of malfeasance will be severely punished, the regime has done little to root out official corruption. Moreover, the US Embassy reports incidents of malpractice at the ministerial level are multiplying.

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**The Police Scandal**

In late December several high-ranking police officials, including Commissioner Ngurube and Deputy Commissioner Mhora, were dismissed and charged with numerous acts of malfeasance. Later that month, three more senior police officials were forced to resign, according to press reports. The actions followed an extensive investigation by an independent commission of inquiry

**The Military**

Last summer several high-ranking Ministry of Defense officials were discharged for misconduct and embezzling government funds, according to press reports. indicates that the dismissals may have been related to an internal defense investigation that discovered several private firms supplying ammunition and spare parts to the military had defrauded the government of more than \$500,000.

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Although the arrests were highly touted as an effort by the government to crack down on official corruption, we think it is unlikely that any of the police officials will be brought to trial.

**At the Ministerial Level**

Mugabe is generally viewed by the public as not personally involved in official corruption even though

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**The Leadership Code**

Following the general elections last summer, Mugabe publicly announced his intention to begin enforcing a leadership code—a standard of conduct designed to limit business and property holdings by senior party officials—and crack down on corruption in government. [REDACTED]

More important, in our view, Zimbabweans are growing increasingly skeptical of claims by the government that it is curbing corruption and malpractice by senior civil servants. Local reporting indicates that popular resentment has slowly surfaced and that Mugabe is being criticized privately for failing to punish senior government officials. We do not believe, however, that the issue has reached a level where it threatens the regime's stability. Nonetheless, as Mugabe moves toward a one-party state, increased incidents of official corruption will prompt additional popular dissatisfaction against the government. [REDACTED]

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**Outlook**

The series of scandals and continuing reports of high-level malfeasance highlight the steady growth of corruption since independence. The government will, from time to time, undertake highly publicized moves to attack the problem but, in our judgment, few, if any, senior government officials will be brought to trial. Party officials, however, will pay lipservice to the leadership code and Mugabe will use it to crack down on political opponents. [REDACTED]

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## Zimbabwe: Air Force Development Stalls [ ]

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The exodus of highly skilled white pilots and technicians since independence in 1980, along with fewer aircraft available for operations, has greatly reduced the capabilities of Zimbabwe's once formidable Air Force. Moreover, inadequate foreign training for new recruits, including Pakistani officers seconded to the Air Force, has contributed to the downward slide. The Air Force recently has been criticized heavily for its performance in actions against Mozambican insurgents. Because of the time required to train new pilots and technicians, and the expense of new equipment, we believe the Air Force will remain dependent for some time on foreign advisers and the few whites left over from the former Rhodesian Air Force. [ ]

### The Bombing of Thornhill

In July 1982, the Thornhill Airbase near Gweru was attacked by saboteurs who destroyed seven of Zimbabwe's 14 Hunter ground attack aircraft and damaged another. According to press reports, one Cessna F-337G light-strike aircraft and one of the four newly delivered Hawk jet trainers were destroyed; the other three were damaged. The attack reduced by over half the Air Force's high performance aircraft and reportedly increased suspicions in Harare of the loyalty of white members of the Air Force. [ ]

The investigation of the Thornhill bombing led to the arrest of six senior officers, all of them white. All were later acquitted by the High Court on the grounds that their confessions had been obtained under torture, but the officers were not allowed to return to service. According to press accounts, their treatment, as well as safety concerns over improper maintenance, led several highly skilled whites to leave the Air Force. [ ]

[ ] one experienced pilot stated that maintenance had become so poor that it was dangerous to fly. [ ]

According to press reports, within a year after the Thornhill incident the Air Force had fewer qualified pilots than operable aircraft. Moreover, 60 percent of

its helicopters were grounded for lack of mechanics to repair them, according to the press. Six of seven group captains left, which, along with the six officers dismissed after the Thornhill incident, drained the pool of experienced commanders to run the Air Force. At this time, Mugabe requested Pakistani help in overseeing the transition of the Air Force into a predominantly black service. [ ]

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### Pakistanis in Command

In July 1983 Pakistani Air Marshal Daudpota—sent to Zimbabwe along with approximately 60 advisers—was appointed by Mugabe to command the Air Force. Since then, Daudpota has deliberately allowed recruitment standards to drop in order to find replacements for officers who are leaving, according to [ ]

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[ ] returned to Pakistan early this year along with several Pakistani advisers. As the tours of the remaining advisers end, they will turn over control to [ ]

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The new Air Force commander, Josiah Tungamirai, is a Zimbabwean who had been an Army commander during the guerrilla struggle. [ ]

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We believe that at best the Pakistanis were only able to slow the decline of the Air Force's capabilities. The [ ] that the Air Force is kept operational primarily by the few white maintenance personnel who have stayed on. Pakistan's effort to train black pilots apparently has fallen short.

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[ ] only one black pilot took part in last year's Gorangosa operation against Mozambican insurgents, probably the largest operation mounted since independence. Moreover, those groomed for command by the Pakistanis have not demonstrated an ability to command effectively in operations in Mozambique. [ ]

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**Secret****Zimbabwe's Air Force**

Aircraft	Type	Estimated Inventory	Estimated Operational
Hawk	Jet fighter-bomber	7 to 9	4 to 6
Hunter	Jet fighter-bomber	11 to 12	7 to 8
T.22 Vampire	Jet trainer/fighter-bomber	3	0 to 1
Canberra	Bomber	7	4 to 5
Cessna Lynx	Prop attack/transport	9 to 12	6 to 9
Islander	Prop transport	6 to 7	5
Siai-Marchetti SF 260	Trainer/attack	17 to 24	10 to 12
Dakota	Transport	11 to 13	5 to 7
Casa 212 Aviocars	Transport	6	4 to 5
Augusta-Bell 412 <sup>a</sup>	Helicopter transport	2	2
Bell 205	Helicopter transport	9 to 10	1
Alouette III	Helicopter attack/transport	25 to 30	11 to 16
F-7	Jet fighter-bomber	12 <sup>b</sup>	-

<sup>a</sup> Harare probably will buy 10 more Bell 412 helicopters this year,

<sup>b</sup> Delivery of the Chinese F-7s is expected to begin this year.

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Zimbabwe also has been unable to mount successful training programs in other countries. According to the

after several years of flight training, but none were qualified to fly solo in any aircraft. Of seven flight trainees who have returned from North Korea, three were judged to be medically unfit, and the other four proved only marginally qualified.

**Mozambican Operations**

Zimbabwean troops last summer began offensive operations in Mozambique against the insurgents and established a forward airbase at Chimoio in the central part of the country.

Hunter and Hawk jet aircraft, along with SF-260 light-strike aircraft, were used throughout August and September in a close air support role during attacks on insurgent bases. Helicopter gunships and transport helicopters continue to be used extensively, reportedly with good results.

Despite its initial success, the Air Force's role in Mozambique has come under fire. During the assault on the rebel's Gorongosa camp last August, the Air Force was severely criticized for not attacking until after Zimbabwean ground troops had already begun advancing.

No Zimbabwean casualties resulted from the mishap because the Air Force's bombs fell harmlessly off target. In January, Army commanders faulted the Air Force for an incident in which a transport aircraft lost its way, strayed into Malawian airspace, and was fired on.

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
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
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[redacted] 25X1  
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[redacted] Mugabe 25X1

publicly confirmed that Zimbabwe would buy F-7s following his trip to China last year, but to date no aircraft have been delivered. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] signed a contract last August for 10 Bell-Augusta 412 helicopters to be delivered in March 1986. [redacted] 25X1



In our judgment, it will take years to regain preindependence capabilities, and Zimbabwe probably will never have an Air Force to match that of South Africa. Moreover, the acquisition of new types of aircraft could further complicate maintenance and logistic problems and therefore may only marginally add to the force's readiness over the long term. If Chinese and Libyan training of pilots and technicians is more successful than past programs, however, the Air Force may show some improvement. [redacted] 25X1

The US Embassy reports that the Air Force had used up most of its funds and was relying on a single technician—an expatriate—to load ordnance on fighter-bombers. Moreover, at least four Alouette helicopters and one transport plane have been lost in operations in Mozambique in the past six months, and three other helicopters and several fixed-wing aircraft have been damaged. [redacted]

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#### Looking to the Future

Zimbabwe continues to look for sources of badly needed external training for its pilots and technicians, despite the poor results of previous programs. [redacted]

[redacted] were to arrive soon in Zimbabwe, and Mugabe publicly stated that more than 100 pilots would be trained by the [redacted]



Zimbabwe also is trying to expand its aircraft inventory and has increased the fiscal year 1985/86 budget for aircraft procurement and operating costs from \$9.4 million to over \$16.5 million. [redacted]

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## Burkina: Prospects for Libyan Influence [ ]

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Burkinan President Sankara, who is privately critical of Libya and gave a cool reception to Colonel Qadhafi when he visited Ouagadougou in December, may look to Tripoli for arms and security assistance following his country's recent military defeat by Mali. Although relations between the two countries have been strained since 1984, we think Sankara, who believes his neighbors plan to topple him and is obsessed with security matters, may seek Libyan aid to ensure his survival. [ ]

### Recent Strains in Relations

Libyan arms—some channeled through northern Ghana—were instrumental in bringing Sankara to power. According to US Embassy and [ ] delivered to Sankara's garrison in southern Burkina armored cars, mortars, uniforms, small arms, and ammunition that were used to topple the moderate but inept Ouedraogo administration in August 1983. Sankara initially admired Qadhafi's revolution, and Libya provided his new regime with a \$10 million loan for balance-of-payments support, according to Embassy and press reports. [ ]

Since 1984, however, Tripoli has failed to provide substantial economic aid, and Ouagadougou's suspicions of Qadhafi's intentions have grown, according to the US Embassy. Libya has fallen short of Sankara's expectations of a financial windfall and in the past two years has provided only token donations of food, medicine, and technical equipment. The Embassy reports that in November 1984 Sankara charged Tripoli with reneging on a promise of a second \$10 million loan, this one to help finance construction of the Tambao railway, despite Libyan denials of any commitments. Although Sankara agreed in 1983 to allow Libya to convert its Embassy to a People's Bureau, he has since rebuffed Libyan offers to provide funding for mosques and has refused to allow the distribution of Green Books in his country. [ ]

Moreover, Sankara has not hesitated to criticize Libya's regional role, probably to assert his independent foreign policy and to dispel regional fears that he is Qadhafi's pawn. He has deplored the Libyan military presence in Chad, rejected Tripoli's pressures for a security pact, portrayed the Libyan-Moroccan union as a betrayal of the Saharan people, and belittled Libyan financial aid to West Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. The Embassy also reports that Sankara has refused Libyan requests to use Burkinan territory to undermine neighboring West African regimes. [ ]

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### The Military Factor

Although Tripoli has provided only token military aid to Burkina in the last two years, Sankara may look to Libya for arms as a result of his country's defeat in the "Christmas War," in which Mali seized disputed northern territory in Burkina. Ouagadougou was unable to launch a counteroffensive because of logistic and materiel problems, had no defense against Malian airstrikes, and probably had to use Libyans to pilot the SF-260 that bombed the Malian town of Sikasso, according to several Embassy and [ ]

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[ ] which are maintained by six Libyan Air Force personnel in Ouagadougou, according to the [ ]

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Nevertheless, the [ ] regard the Libyans as racist and that in 1984 Burkina withdrew its 45 military cadets from Tripoli because of poor living conditions and harsh treatment by the Libyan instructors. [ ]

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### Outlook

Despite Burkina's need to upgrade its military capabilities, we believe Sankara is unlikely to seek

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relatively advanced weapons—such as tanks and MIGs—that would draw attention to a “Libyan connection” and jeopardize key economic assistance from France and other donor countries. He is more likely to ask for antitank and antiaircraft weapons to offset Mali’s superior armored and air capabilities.

[redacted]

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We believe that Sankara will turn to Libya for substantial military and security aid only if he is convinced—probably incorrectly—that Mali, Ivory Coast, and France are trying to topple him. The US Embassy reports that Sankara deeply fears the dissidents based in neighboring countries and in Paris, although we believe they currently lack the leadership, funding, and internal support necessary to oust him. Sankara almost certainly realizes that a public alliance with Tripoli will endanger Western aid, but we believe he will do whatever is necessary to ensure his survival. [redacted]

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For his part, Qadhafi is likely to continue to offer modest amounts of economic and military assistance while trying to exploit Sankara’s vulnerabilities. We believe Libya may attempt to make contact with some rival to Sankara who might be more amenable to Libyan influence after a coup. The six Libyan instructors who serve at the military garrison at Po may seek to cultivate junior officers and enlisted men disenchanted with Sankara, while the 20-man People’s Bureau in the capital may attempt to recruit disaffected trade unionists and students, who are angered by Sankara’s repressive measures as well as his economic austerity program. The Embassy reports the Libyans so far have unsuccessfully courted the Muslim community, which constitutes some 30 percent of the population. [redacted]

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## Comoros: President Abdallah's Prospects

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President Abdallah's hold on power has weakened considerably since he was elected to a second six-year term in October 1984. The President, a pro-Western conservative, is beset by rising popular discontent over his poor administration of the economy, and the lingering presence of the widely hated European mercenary contingent that keeps him in power. In addition, he must cope with [ ] political maneuvering by opportunistic opponents espousing a variety of views. [ ]



President Ahmed Abdallah [ ]

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### Popular Disaffection

The island inhabitants clearly are distressed over worsening economic conditions. The Comoros have almost no natural resources, little arable land, poor prospects for fishing in coastal waters, and a burgeoning population that threatens to overwhelm current food production and existing social services. Reduced world demand for Comoran exports—primarily spices, copra, and perfume essence—has sapped foreign exchange reserves in recent years. In our view, Abdallah has done little to remedy the country's economic ills other than to appeal largely to the West for urgent economic assistance. For example, the prospect of having Abdallah's home island of Anjouan lose electrical power because the government failed to pay its utility bills recently led Abdallah to seek emergency donor aid, according to US Embassy reporting. France has bailed the Comoros out of financial difficulties in the past but is less inclined to extend new aid, prompting Abdallah to turn increasingly to the United States. [ ]

difficulties, according to the Embassy. The presence of mercenaries dates from 1978 when they assisted Abdallah in deposing the radical Ali Soileh; in 1975 many of the same mercenaries had ousted Abdallah after one month in office and installed Soileh. Embassy reporting indicates the Comorans believe that, in addition to their security role, the mercenaries have significant political influence with Abdallah and are responsible for many unpopular regime actions. The Embassy reports a growing sentiment among younger Comorans that they can deal with their internal problems if only the mercenaries depart. According to the Embassy, animosity toward the mercenaries is on the rise following their harsh interrogations of civilians and military personnel implicated in an aborted coup attempt and mercenary assassination plot in March 1985. [ ]

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Urban violence, often against foreigners, is increasing as unemployed youths react to the country's economic malaise, according to the US Embassy. The Embassy believes that violence could increase, and it cites reports that arms caches, probably belonging to the illegal opposition Democratic Front, have been stashed on two Comoran islands. [ ]

### The Opposition

Abdallah's declining popularity has emboldened his opponents. Several politicians have formed what they call the "constitutional opposition." This group, consisting of four influential ministers Abdallah dismissed last fall, has stated that it is prepared to

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Most Comorans believe that the President's dependence on the approximately 60 mercenaries for his security is at the root of the country's political

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*Opposition Leader Mouzaour  
Abdallah* [redacted]

assume office if Abdallah, 67, steps down, according to the US Embassy. This leadership, however, lacks popular support and is fragmented and united by little other than personal ambition, in our view. Another opposition leader, Mouzaour Abdallah, former Foreign Minister under Soileh, recently returned to Comoros from exile in France and met privately with the President. According to the Embassy, they may have discussed conditions under which Mouzaour Abdallah might join the government. [redacted]

Abdallah has told US officials of his concern about the Marxist-Leninist Communist Movement of the Comoros (MCMLC) that was behind the plot to overthrow him last March. The Embassy indicates that the MCMLC has contacts with the French Communist Party and controls the Democratic Front, which includes more moderate factions. Despite government successes in arresting MCMLC leaders and uncovering the movement's islands-wide network, the group has not been completely eliminated and, according to Embassy reporting, probably still has some support in the military, including Abdallah's Presidential Guard, and among students and the unemployed. The MCMLC, after additional time to recoup its losses, almost certainly will attempt again to topple Abdallah. [redacted]

Abdallah's external opponents, based largely in France, appear more moderate and conservative. Mohamed Taki, former Federal Assembly president now in exile in Paris, has emerged as one of the key

leaders of the Paris-based opposition, in our view, since Mouzaour Abdallah's return to Comoros. The remaining exiles, unlike Mouzaour Abdallah, appear unwilling to work with Abdallah [redacted]

[redacted] These dissidents, as well as those in Comoros, may receive support from some rightwing French politicians critical of Abdallah's regime and his vociferous stand on integrating the French possession of Mayotte under Comoran sovereignty. [redacted]

Little is known of Comoran dissident activities outside France. Prince Said Ali Kemal, son of an influential sultan in the preindependence era, [redacted]

[redacted] recently visited Madagascar, Reunion, and Mayotte, probably to solicit support from Comoran exiles there. The US Embassy reports that Abdallah believes the small Comoran dissident community in Tanzania is in touch with Soviet diplomats in Dar es Salaam. [redacted]

#### **Abdallah's Watchdogs**

Despite his difficulties, Abdallah appears confident that he can retain power with the assistance of the mercenary leadership of his Presidential Guard. The mercenaries, led in Comoros by "Commandant Charles," have some support from the French and possibly South Africa, and they probably can suppress domestic unrest and the MCMLC. Mercenary unity has suffered, however, from wrangling between Charles and the overall mercenary commander Bob Denard, who resides in South Africa. The US Embassy reports that Charles, regarded as France's man in Comoros, may resign and leave the country in March, which could weaken further Abdallah's hired protectors. [redacted]

#### **External Interests**

US Embassy reporting indicates that Paris believes Abdallah probably can maintain his grip on power, at least for the near term. Although France may have been involved in the coup that ousted Abdallah in 1975, Paris appears resigned to Abdallah's leadership and is comfortable with his staunchly pro-Western orientation. [redacted]

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*Mercenary Leader "Commandant Charles"* [redacted]

On the basis of US Embassy reporting, we have identified a few alternative scenarios for a change of leadership. If Abdallah continues to lose legitimacy and support over his failure to deal with the economy, he may be compelled to resign and turn over power to a group of moderates, possibly the "constitutional opposition," who almost certainly would be designated by France. Alternatively, if Abdallah does not step down, the moderate exile opposition may obtain enough French support for a successful bid to take power, a possibility if the French right wins the national elections in March. Any moderate regime replacing Abdallah still would be vulnerable to coup attempts by the leftist Democratic Front and the radical MCMLC. Should these groups overthrow the government, a successor regime probably would tilt toward Moscow but probably would look eventually to the West for economic support. [redacted]

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The Soviets place a relatively low priority on Comoros, in our view, displaying more interest in the socialist Indian Ocean island states of Madagascar and Seychelles, where air and naval facilities are better developed. Moreover, Moscow provided almost no economic or security assistance to the radical Soileh regime in 1975-78. The Soviets, however, may regard Comoros as a fallback should their influence and prospects in either Madagascar or Seychelles wane. According to US Embassy reports, Abdallah has rebuffed most overtures by Soviet Ambassador Orlov, resident in Seychelles. He has, however, accepted a small scholarship offer from the Soviets, probably to demonstrate to the West that his loyalty should not be taken for granted. [redacted]

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#### Outlook

Prospects for long-term stability are poor. Abdallah probably can cope with domestic discontent over the economy and the mercenaries as long as his opponents remain divided and lack support. The mercenaries, in our view, hold the key to Abdallah's survival. Should mercenary unity fragment further over leadership squabbles, Abdallah's prospects would dwindle significantly. [redacted]

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## South Africa: Motor Industry Blues

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Faced with an estimated loss of \$200 million for 1985, South African automobile industry representatives have made urgent appeals to the government for assistance, stressing that industry failure would add to South Africa's serious black unemployment problem. A gradual reduction in the prime lending rate from a high of 25 percent to the current 15.5 percent, an easing of restrictions on consumer loans, and an economic recovery of about 3-percent real growth for 1986 should ease slightly the motor industry's blues, but a significant recovery is unlikely before 1987 at the earliest. In the meantime, industry sources expect more mergers and withdrawal from the market.

instituted short workweeks and laid off workers in an effort to cut costs and minimize losses. every car-production worker laid off also releases four workers in related industries. An estimated 33,000 persons from production and related industries have lost their jobs in the last two years. Racial unrest in the Eastern Cape, which depends on the auto industry as a major employer, has clearly been aggravated by the car industry's woes and is likely to increase as several companies in the Port Elizabeth area, including Ford, close plants.

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### Outlook

Government efforts to restimulate the economy should ease auto industry troubles. The drop in the prime rate and an extension of the maximum allowable consumer credit payment terms from 42 to 48 months are expected to boost sales slightly. However, car manufacturers' pleas for reduced taxes to provide consumers with more disposable income and a freeze on the prices of component parts have been rejected.

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### Slipping Out of Gear

The industry grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s with the impetus of government protection and the growing affluence of most whites. In an effort to reduce the country's vulnerability to foreign economic sanctions and speed economic development, the government had passed legislation requiring 66-percent local content by weight for all cars sold in the country. Other government regulations were intended to prevent any company from capturing a large share of the market. As a result, South Africa's small market is split among 10 manufacturers who have a total annual capacity to produce 400,000 cars.

the likely long-run solution is a rationalization of the industry through further plant closures by some foreign-owned companies and mergers of the remaining manufacturers. Mergers allow companies to maintain a presence in the country while spreading costs over large total sales. For example, in early 1985 Samcor was formed as a merger of Ford and Amcar, a South African manufacturer owned by the Anglo-American corporation. Industry rumors suggest that BMW and General Motors will do likewise in 1986. Many companies, however, are simply pulling out—three years of losses and a shrinking market share have led Alfa Romeo, Renault, and Peugeot, whose South African subsidiaries were all partly owned by Samcor, to quit the market. Other manufacturers, such as

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The car market for whites is virtually saturated: car ownership is about 500 cars per 1,000 white South Africans. Automobile replacement is unlikely to be able to maintain a high market demand because cars have a lifespan of 10 to 11 years in South Africa. Moreover, despite larger gains in real income and a black ownership ratio of some 50 cars per 1,000 people, few blacks earn enough to buy a new car.

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Car sales also have slumped as a result of Africa's worst economic downturn since the 1930s, higher sales taxes, and a prime lending rate that reached 25 percent in August 1984. Only Toyota is expected to make a profit this year. Other companies have

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Nissan, may also leave if they cannot increase their market share or merge with another manufacturer.

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The government's economic measures aimed at promoting growth may boost car sales slightly in 1986, but the recovery next year will be modest at best. Prevailing high interest rates, along with across-the-board price increases caused by the falling rand, will inhibit sales. As the market stays depressed, probably for at least two to three years, industry rationalization will continue, adding to the already high black unemployment rate and possibly fueling tensions in areas, such as Port Elizabeth, that have been hit hard by industry failure. [REDACTED]

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## Africa Briefs

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**Botswana-Zimbabwe**
**Hardly a Stampede** 

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About 200 Zimbabwean refugees from the Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana have voluntarily returned to their country, according to press reports. Most of the returning refugees fled Zimbabwe following scenes of violent incidents that took place between government and the political opposition in Matabeleland Province before the national elections last July. The refugees cited frustration over the lack of educational and work opportunities at the camp as reasons for returning to Zimbabwe. Some probably saw the merger talks between the government and the opposition as a sign of reduced tensions. About 4,000 Zimbabweans are still in Dukwe, and UN officials expect an additional 500 refugees to repatriate in the coming months, according to US Embassy reporting. Harare has accused Gaborone of providing safehaven for opposition party members at the camp, and continued repatriation probably would lessen tensions between the two countries.

 25X1**Lesotho****Food Deficit Expected** 

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Lesotho's corn harvest probably will fall short of domestic requirements,   To reduce dependence on South Africa, Lesotho halted the spraying of herbicides and insecticides last spring by South African agricultural consultants. As a result, insect infestation has sharply reduced corn production and could affect the crop for the next two or three growing seasons. South Africa, however, is expected to have a corn surplus this year and is favorably disposed toward the new government, which ousted Chief Jonathan last month. The new regime already has pleased Pretoria by expelling African National Congress guerrillas and harassing Soviet Bloc embassies.

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